Eight weeks after the Second Analysis (23 Sep 2026) and twelve after the First (27 Aug) · 120 series · 345k observations · 28 chokepoints + 12 oil ports · chokepoints to 15 Nov 2026, ports to 13 Nov · dashed lines on the charts mark the two earlier editions.
The First and Second Analyses were internal notes; the “First Analysis … / Second Analysis …” boxes quote what they said, and each “Now” beside them is today’s data.
August (the First Analysis’s month), September (the Second’s, now complete), October, and November to date. Every number is a monthly mean of the daily series.
| Series | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov* | Nov vs Sep | context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hormuz tanker transits / day | 1.9 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | -35% | Second: 0.95/day (1–20 Sep), level with March |
| Hormuz all-vessel transits / day | 4.7 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 2.9 | -19% | 2024 mean 91 |
| Bab el-Mandeb tankers / day | 8.5 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 8.3 | +3% | Second: 7.3/day (1–20 Sep) |
| Cape of Good Hope tankers / day | 20.2 | 17.8 | 19.4 | 16.7 | -6% | Second: fell with Bab el-Mandeb, 16.9 |
| Both Red Sea routes, tankers / day | 28.7 | 25.9 | 28.3 | 25.0 | -3% | Second: 24/day, fewest since Jan-2024 |
| Kerch tankers / day | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | – | Second: zero |
| Brent spot, USD/bbl | $91.08 | $114.16 | $123.93 | $96.92 | -15% | peak $135.51 on 2 Oct; last $92.14 on 11 Nov |
| Brent − WTI, USD/bbl | $7.34 | $17.06 | $21.86 | $3.24 | -81% | peak $37.62 on 2 Oct; last $2.52 |
| Fujairah tanker exports, t/day | 66k | 93k | 89k | 104k | +11% | Second: rebuilt to 88k |
| Jubail tanker exports, t/day | 39k | 36k | 48k | 24k | -32% | Second: 71% below 2024 |
| Novorossiysk tanker exports, t/day | 158k | 162k | 67k | 37k | -77% | Second: back to its 2025 norm |
| Ust-Luga + Primorsk exports, t/day | 145k | 182k | 148k | 100k | -45% | Second: recovering, 189k |
| Ningbo + Qingdao tanker imports, t/day | 199k | 189k | 234k | 321k | +70% | Second: 34% below 2024 |
| Sikka (Jamnagar) tanker exports, t/day | 71k | 71k | 69k | 66k | -7% | Second: 89% above 2024 |
| Houston tanker exports, t/day | 418k | 425k | 374k | 353k | -17% | Second: 432k YTD, unchanged |
| Rotterdam tanker imports, t/day | 393k | 451k | 404k | 409k | -9% | Second: highest since Feb-2025 |
* November = 1–15 for chokepoints, 1–13 for ports, prices to 11 Nov. September is the full month here; the Second Analysis had 1–20 Sep, and those days came through revision unchanged (Hormuz 0.95 then, 0.95 now; both Red Sea routes 24 then, 24.2 now). Red/blue = November moved 20 % or more against September.
Daily tanker transits, Strait of Hormuz, Jan → 15 Nov 2026. Faint = daily, bold = 7-day mean.
| tankers/day | all vessels/day | |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-09 | 49.8 | 87.9 |
| 2025-10 | 49.5 | 89.4 |
| 2025-11 | 38.4 | 67.4 |
| 2025-12 | 30.4 | 55.5 |
| 2026-01 | 31.1 | 58.5 |
| 2026-02 | 43.5 | 78.2 |
| 2026-03 | 0.9 | 3.2 |
| 2026-04 | 3.2 | 7.1 |
| 2026-05 | 1.3 | 3.9 |
| 2026-06 | 5.4 | 12.9 |
| 2026-07 | 4.8 | 10.2 |
| 2026-08 | 1.9 | 4.7 |
| 2026-09 | 1.1 | 3.6 |
| 2026-10 | 0.7 | 3.8 |
| 2026-11 | 0.7 | 2.9 |
The closure has settled into a floor: zero to 5 tankers a day, with an average size of 11k DWT in the last 30 days against 47k in 2024. Coasters and product tankers still move; the crude fleet does not.
hormuz_reopening_attempt: a run of 3 or more days above 8 tankers with DWT per transit above 40k, with the June window as the back-test. Now: since 12 July the busiest day carried 5 tankers, and 0 days passed more than 8. The rule would have stayed silent for four months, which is the right answer.Daily tanker transits through Hormuz, 1 June → 15 Nov 2026. The three labelled bars are the June window; nothing since has come close.
The June window (12/day from 18 June to 8 July, peaking at 21 on 25 Jun) is still the only reopening attempt in the daily record. Run over every day since 15 March, the rule fires 2 times (23 Jun–25 Jun, 5 Jul–7 Jul): the window and nothing else. Before March it would fire every day, so it belongs to the closed regime only.
Brent and WTI spot, USD/bbl, Sep-2025 → now (EIA daily, PET.RBRTE.D / PET.RWTC.D).
Brent − WTI, USD/bbl: $3.58 average through 2025, $37.62 on 2 Oct, $2.52 at the last print.
Hormuz tanker transits, 7-day mean, same time axis.
| Brent | WTI | spread | Hormuz tankers/day | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-09 | 67.99 | 63.96 | 4.07 | 49.83 |
| 2025-10 | 64.54 | 60.89 | 3.67 | 49.48 |
| 2025-11 | 63.80 | 60.06 | 3.71 | 38.40 |
| 2025-12 | 62.54 | 57.97 | 4.51 | 30.42 |
| 2026-01 | 66.60 | 60.04 | 6.55 | 31.13 |
| 2026-02 | 70.89 | 64.51 | 6.38 | 43.46 |
| 2026-03 | 103.13 | 91.38 | 11.75 | 0.94 |
| 2026-04 | 117.29 | 100.32 | 17.66 | 3.17 |
| 2026-05 | 107.14 | 102.13 | 5.41 | 1.29 |
| 2026-06 | 85.40 | 84.81 | 0.83 | 5.40 |
| 2026-07 | 83.76 | 79.99 | 3.76 | 4.77 |
| 2026-08 | 91.08 | 83.90 | 7.34 | 1.87 |
| 2026-09 | 114.16 | 97.10 | 17.06 | 1.13 |
| 2026-10 | 123.93 | 102.07 | 21.86 | 0.74 |
| 2026-11 | 96.92 | 93.69 | 3.24 | 0.73 |
Both legs of the move happened with the strait shut and unchanged, at about one tanker a day before, during and after. Brent went from $90 to $136 and back to $92 while the transit count stayed flat, which settles the Second Analysis’s reading: this premium was not about Hormuz. The flows do not explain the fall either. Russian seaborne exports through our three ports fell 60% between September and November (section 5), which on its own would push prices up. This dataset shows what moved; it cannot say why the price fell.
redsea_capacity_shrinking signal fired. Now: October recovered to 28.3 (Bab el-Mandeb 9.0, Good Hope 19.4). November to date is 25.0, the lowest month since Jan-2024 and below its trailing-12-month low of 25.9, so the signal fires again (2026: Sep, Nov).Monthly tanker transits/day: Bab el-Mandeb, Cape of Good Hope and their sum, 2023 → Nov-2026 (November to the 15th). Dashed at the right: the First and Second Analyses.
| Bab el-Mandeb | Good Hope | both routes | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-01 | 25.2 | 8.9 | 34.1 |
| 2023-02 | 25.1 | 8.3 | 33.4 |
| 2023-03 | 26.2 | 8.6 | 34.8 |
| 2023-04 | 26.6 | 9.0 | 35.6 |
| 2023-05 | 26.7 | 8.8 | 35.5 |
| 2023-06 | 26.6 | 9.0 | 35.7 |
| 2023-07 | 27.1 | 9.6 | 36.7 |
| 2023-08 | 24.6 | 9.6 | 34.2 |
| 2023-09 | 26.4 | 8.8 | 35.2 |
| 2023-10 | 26.9 | 10.0 | 36.9 |
| 2023-11 | 26.3 | 9.9 | 36.2 |
| 2023-12 | 25.2 | 10.5 | 35.7 |
| 2024-01 | 13.6 | 15.9 | 29.5 |
| 2024-02 | 12.2 | 19.8 | 32.0 |
| 2024-03 | 12.5 | 18.8 | 31.3 |
| 2024-04 | 12.0 | 19.0 | 31.0 |
| 2024-05 | 11.6 | 20.6 | 32.3 |
| 2024-06 | 11.6 | 22.6 | 34.2 |
| 2024-07 | 11.3 | 19.9 | 31.1 |
| 2024-08 | 10.7 | 18.2 | 28.9 |
| 2024-09 | 10.6 | 18.0 | 28.6 |
| 2024-10 | 10.4 | 20.3 | 30.7 |
| 2024-11 | 11.4 | 17.0 | 28.4 |
| 2024-12 | 11.4 | 16.9 | 28.2 |
| 2025-01 | 10.6 | 15.5 | 26.1 |
| 2025-02 | 10.6 | 15.9 | 26.4 |
| 2025-03 | 11.8 | 14.8 | 26.6 |
| 2025-04 | 11.7 | 17.1 | 28.8 |
| 2025-05 | 11.3 | 17.3 | 28.6 |
| 2025-06 | 11.6 | 16.6 | 28.2 |
| 2025-07 | 10.8 | 17.1 | 27.9 |
| 2025-08 | 11.4 | 18.6 | 30.1 |
| 2025-09 | 11.0 | 18.5 | 29.5 |
| 2025-10 | 12.4 | 18.5 | 30.9 |
| 2025-11 | 12.8 | 16.7 | 29.5 |
| 2025-12 | 11.6 | 15.9 | 27.5 |
| 2026-01 | 11.5 | 16.4 | 27.9 |
| 2026-02 | 13.8 | 13.5 | 27.2 |
| 2026-03 | 15.0 | 17.7 | 32.7 |
| 2026-04 | 14.6 | 23.0 | 37.6 |
| 2026-05 | 13.9 | 21.2 | 35.1 |
| 2026-06 | 13.8 | 20.1 | 33.9 |
| 2026-07 | 11.6 | 17.4 | 29.0 |
| 2026-08 | 8.5 | 20.2 | 28.7 |
| 2026-09 | 8.0 | 17.8 | 25.9 |
| 2026-10 | 9.0 | 19.4 | 28.3 |
| 2026-11 | 8.3 | 16.7 | 25.0 |
The two routes now swing between 25 and 28 tankers a day, against 31 in 2024. Over the last 30 days Bab el-Mandeb is 25% below 2024 and Good Hope is back near its 2024 level (3% below). One reading the Second Analysis did not make: Suez is 10% above 2024 while Bab el-Mandeb is 25% below, so more tankers enter the Red Sea from the north than leave it to the south. That fits Saudi crude loading at Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast outside Hormuz, and heading to Europe. Yanbu is not one of our curated ports, so this is a hypothesis to check, not a finding.
Tanker export volume, t/day, monthly mean: Ust-Luga, Primorsk (Baltic) and Novorossiysk (Black Sea), 2024 → Nov-2026. Dashed at the right: the First and Second Analyses.
| Ust-Luga | Primorsk | Novorossiysk | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-01 | 173,038.0 | 225,769.0 | 90,742.0 |
| 2024-02 | 203,589.0 | 175,256.0 | 86,448.0 |
| 2024-03 | 181,592.0 | 162,454.0 | 99,621.0 |
| 2024-04 | 169,751.0 | 178,705.0 | 99,689.0 |
| 2024-05 | 168,972.0 | 156,210.0 | 101,634.0 |
| 2024-06 | 160,260.0 | 141,457.0 | 92,763.0 |
| 2024-07 | 109,509.0 | 126,895.0 | 109,736.0 |
| 2024-08 | 148,037.0 | 104,113.0 | 83,924.0 |
| 2024-09 | 132,512.0 | 100,064.0 | 111,374.0 |
| 2024-10 | 139,296.0 | 130,068.0 | 119,434.0 |
| 2024-11 | 92,953.0 | 123,187.0 | 95,178.0 |
| 2024-12 | 102,724.0 | 124,693.0 | 105,894.0 |
| 2025-01 | 65,417.0 | 162,147.0 | 138,925.0 |
| 2025-02 | 58,873.0 | 131,501.0 | 118,345.0 |
| 2025-03 | 107,277.0 | 146,212.0 | 127,548.0 |
| 2025-04 | 88,133.0 | 133,994.0 | 122,986.0 |
| 2025-05 | 103,211.0 | 148,938.0 | 118,727.0 |
| 2025-06 | 120,048.0 | 131,360.0 | 128,096.0 |
| 2025-07 | 118,384.0 | 113,556.0 | 135,527.0 |
| 2025-08 | 77,846.0 | 144,199.0 | 121,922.0 |
| 2025-09 | 70,203.0 | 160,736.0 | 132,679.0 |
| 2025-10 | 41,188.0 | 144,625.0 | 167,785.0 |
| 2025-11 | 69,782.0 | 129,590.0 | 122,021.0 |
| 2025-12 | 68,239.0 | 117,611.0 | 176,317.0 |
| 2026-01 | 48,160.0 | 92,134.0 | 124,134.0 |
| 2026-02 | 46,557.0 | 26,634.0 | 158,209.0 |
| 2026-03 | 53,082.0 | 27,248.0 | 222,727.0 |
| 2026-04 | 23,400.0 | 28,455.0 | 289,052.0 |
| 2026-05 | 66,048.0 | 100,229.0 | 339,476.0 |
| 2026-06 | 71,982.0 | 78,725.0 | 306,771.0 |
| 2026-07 | 57,256.0 | 115,641.0 | 222,253.0 |
| 2026-08 | 76,210.0 | 68,558.0 | 157,693.0 |
| 2026-09 | 95,249.0 | 86,512.0 | 162,140.0 |
| 2026-10 | 78,616.0 | 69,624.0 | 66,665.0 |
| 2026-11 | 43,684.0 | 55,995.0 | 36,989.0 |
The three ports together, monthly mean t/day, since the data starts in Jan-2019.
| three ports, t/day | |
|---|---|
| 2025-01 | 366,489.0 |
| 2025-02 | 308,719.0 |
| 2025-03 | 381,038.0 |
| 2025-04 | 345,113.0 |
| 2025-05 | 370,876.0 |
| 2025-06 | 379,504.0 |
| 2025-07 | 367,467.0 |
| 2025-08 | 343,968.0 |
| 2025-09 | 363,618.0 |
| 2025-10 | 353,598.0 |
| 2025-11 | 321,393.0 |
| 2025-12 | 362,167.0 |
| 2026-01 | 264,428.0 |
| 2026-02 | 231,399.0 |
| 2026-03 | 303,057.0 |
| 2026-04 | 340,907.0 |
| 2026-05 | 505,753.0 |
| 2026-06 | 457,478.0 |
| 2026-07 | 395,150.0 |
| 2026-08 | 302,462.0 |
| 2026-09 | 343,900.0 |
| 2026-10 | 214,906.0 |
| 2026-11 | 136,668.0 |
Two cautions. These are three curated ports, not all of Russia: Kozmino on the Pacific, the Arctic terminals and the smaller Black Sea berths are not in the set, so some of the drop may be cargo loading elsewhere. And Novorossiysk is lumpy, one or two tanker calls a day, so a quiet fortnight moves its monthly mean a lot. Even so, both outlets falling together for two months is a different pattern from the spring, when one rose as the other fell. Kerch carried 0.2 tankers/day in November, a few transits after two months at zero.
Kerch Strait, monthly transits/day, all vessels and tankers, 2023 → Nov-2026.
| all vessels | tankers | |
|---|---|---|
| 2023-01 | 17.7 | 4.4 |
| 2023-02 | 18.8 | 5.4 |
| 2023-03 | 13.1 | 3.6 |
| 2023-04 | 11.7 | 2.9 |
| 2023-05 | 11.6 | 3.2 |
| 2023-06 | 5.6 | 1.7 |
| 2023-07 | 5.5 | 1.5 |
| 2023-08 | 3.4 | 0.6 |
| 2023-09 | 1.3 | 0.2 |
| 2023-10 | 4.2 | 1.1 |
| 2023-11 | 2.8 | 0.9 |
| 2023-12 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
| 2024-01 | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| 2024-02 | 0.8 | 0.2 |
| 2024-03 | 14.7 | 3.2 |
| 2024-04 | 13.8 | 3.6 |
| 2024-05 | 1.6 | 0.4 |
| 2024-06 | 2.7 | 0.8 |
| 2024-07 | 1.3 | 0.2 |
| 2024-08 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| 2024-09 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| 2024-10 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| 2024-11 | 5.3 | 1.7 |
| 2024-12 | 13.9 | 3.8 |
| 2025-01 | 8.4 | 2.3 |
| 2025-02 | 5.4 | 1.9 |
| 2025-03 | 11.3 | 3.7 |
| 2025-04 | 6.9 | 2.5 |
| 2025-05 | 13.6 | 4.2 |
| 2025-06 | 13.5 | 5.0 |
| 2025-07 | 14.8 | 5.2 |
| 2025-08 | 19.6 | 4.9 |
| 2025-09 | 19.8 | 4.2 |
| 2025-10 | 20.8 | 5.0 |
| 2025-11 | 20.6 | 6.0 |
| 2025-12 | 10.6 | 2.8 |
| 2026-01 | 11.8 | 2.5 |
| 2026-02 | 13.4 | 2.9 |
| 2026-03 | 16.7 | 3.7 |
| 2026-04 | 8.8 | 1.7 |
| 2026-05 | 10.6 | 2.5 |
| 2026-06 | 11.3 | 2.2 |
| 2026-07 | 2.8 | 0.4 |
| 2026-08 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| 2026-09 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2026-10 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| 2026-11 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
Tanker volumes, t/day, monthly mean: Fujairah (UAE east coast, outside the strait) exports and imports vs Jubail (Saudi Gulf coast, inside it) exports, 2024 → Nov-2026.
| Fujairah exports | Jubail exports | Fujairah imports | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-01 | 94,020.0 | 60,799.0 | 92,738.0 |
| 2024-02 | 92,685.0 | 49,480.0 | 95,702.0 |
| 2024-03 | 99,991.0 | 112,979.0 | 97,002.0 |
| 2024-04 | 99,569.0 | 110,245.0 | 113,822.0 |
| 2024-05 | 108,336.0 | 100,514.0 | 124,259.0 |
| 2024-06 | 111,968.0 | 109,642.0 | 90,825.0 |
| 2024-07 | 110,768.0 | 103,821.0 | 96,842.0 |
| 2024-08 | 114,095.0 | 80,357.0 | 113,163.0 |
| 2024-09 | 106,871.0 | 113,937.0 | 113,864.0 |
| 2024-10 | 117,538.0 | 107,281.0 | 94,871.0 |
| 2024-11 | 106,492.0 | 101,180.0 | 117,437.0 |
| 2024-12 | 117,198.0 | 99,210.0 | 104,506.0 |
| 2025-01 | 109,250.0 | 79,306.0 | 118,272.0 |
| 2025-02 | 110,960.0 | 88,712.0 | 104,583.0 |
| 2025-03 | 100,553.0 | 104,126.0 | 117,610.0 |
| 2025-04 | 96,286.0 | 130,086.0 | 84,850.0 |
| 2025-05 | 116,006.0 | 84,140.0 | 73,417.0 |
| 2025-06 | 103,745.0 | 75,454.0 | 112,187.0 |
| 2025-07 | 105,064.0 | 94,296.0 | 76,746.0 |
| 2025-08 | 112,588.0 | 126,746.0 | 94,478.0 |
| 2025-09 | 107,435.0 | 119,345.0 | 98,027.0 |
| 2025-10 | 109,975.0 | 108,003.0 | 103,784.0 |
| 2025-11 | 91,645.0 | 65,215.0 | 122,886.0 |
| 2025-12 | 107,670.0 | 51,824.0 | 87,505.0 |
| 2026-01 | 98,654.0 | 70,027.0 | 92,946.0 |
| 2026-02 | 96,155.0 | 102,508.0 | 79,893.0 |
| 2026-03 | 4,918.0 | 40,947.0 | 6,709.0 |
| 2026-04 | 45,088.0 | 28,252.0 | 13,311.0 |
| 2026-05 | 11,217.0 | 25,137.0 | 10,412.0 |
| 2026-06 | 27,773.0 | 30,060.0 | 15,430.0 |
| 2026-07 | 57,363.0 | 50,941.0 | 32,884.0 |
| 2026-08 | 66,121.0 | 39,017.0 | 37,049.0 |
| 2026-09 | 93,269.0 | 35,511.0 | 50,010.0 |
| 2026-10 | 88,807.0 | 47,851.0 | 50,065.0 |
| 2026-11 | 103,909.0 | 24,174.0 | 54,140.0 |
Eight months after the cliff, Fujairah’s exports are back to their 2024 level while Jubail ships 25% of its 2024 volume. The Fujairah line has done its job as a recovery tracker. From here it measures how much the overland route can carry, and a fall would be the news.
Tanker volumes, t/day, monthly mean: China’s two curated ports (Ningbo + Qingdao, imports) and India’s Sikka/Jamnagar (exports), 2024 → Nov-2026.
| Ningbo + Qingdao imports | Sikka exports | |
|---|---|---|
| 2024-01 | 355,121.0 | 39,106.0 |
| 2024-02 | 320,397.0 | 25,072.0 |
| 2024-03 | 268,254.0 | 38,981.0 |
| 2024-04 | 291,085.0 | 45,623.0 |
| 2024-05 | 298,701.0 | 52,717.0 |
| 2024-06 | 278,156.0 | 44,849.0 |
| 2024-07 | 287,185.0 | 37,813.0 |
| 2024-08 | 367,418.0 | 28,364.0 |
| 2024-09 | 285,817.0 | 36,060.0 |
| 2024-10 | 269,551.0 | 30,878.0 |
| 2024-11 | 308,611.0 | 32,356.0 |
| 2024-12 | 280,269.0 | 32,992.0 |
| 2025-01 | 257,724.0 | 31,514.0 |
| 2025-02 | 225,899.0 | 32,558.0 |
| 2025-03 | 266,429.0 | 38,917.0 |
| 2025-04 | 302,307.0 | 32,175.0 |
| 2025-05 | 317,254.0 | 39,093.0 |
| 2025-06 | 357,594.0 | 40,619.0 |
| 2025-07 | 270,932.0 | 36,999.0 |
| 2025-08 | 320,121.0 | 26,805.0 |
| 2025-09 | 310,952.0 | 29,189.0 |
| 2025-10 | 354,751.0 | 27,282.0 |
| 2025-11 | 350,106.0 | 30,160.0 |
| 2025-12 | 384,545.0 | 32,499.0 |
| 2026-01 | 290,405.0 | 31,167.0 |
| 2026-02 | 342,693.0 | 32,260.0 |
| 2026-03 | 254,411.0 | 37,995.0 |
| 2026-04 | 240,622.0 | 39,887.0 |
| 2026-05 | 210,702.0 | 57,511.0 |
| 2026-06 | 164,075.0 | 56,983.0 |
| 2026-07 | 214,936.0 | 72,599.0 |
| 2026-08 | 199,335.0 | 71,207.0 |
| 2026-09 | 188,892.0 | 70,831.0 |
| 2026-10 | 234,353.0 | 69,056.0 |
| 2026-11 | 321,458.0 | 65,604.0 |
The Second Analysis dated China’s drop from the Hormuz cliff. The rebound has no matching change at the strait, so the barrels come from somewhere else, and the curated set cannot say where: it has no Brazilian, West African or Russian Pacific ports. November covers 13 days and is the most provisional figure on this page.
Brent − WTI, monthly mean, USD/bbl, 2024 → Nov-2026.
Houston tanker exports, monthly mean, t/day, same time axis.
| Brent − WTI | Houston exports t/day | |
|---|---|---|
| 2024-01 | 6.0 | 363,672.9 |
| 2024-02 | 6.1 | 444,266.6 |
| 2024-03 | 4.1 | 411,544.0 |
| 2024-04 | 4.5 | 397,412.0 |
| 2024-05 | 1.7 | 390,897.3 |
| 2024-06 | 2.3 | 392,364.6 |
| 2024-07 | 3.2 | 359,631.1 |
| 2024-08 | 3.8 | 381,835.5 |
| 2024-09 | 3.6 | 394,152.4 |
| 2024-10 | 3.5 | 394,766.8 |
| 2024-11 | 4.4 | 425,710.8 |
| 2024-12 | 3.8 | 387,397.5 |
| 2025-01 | 3.4 | 361,855.5 |
| 2025-02 | 3.9 | 407,235.4 |
| 2025-03 | 4.5 | 399,230.5 |
| 2025-04 | 4.6 | 418,802.3 |
| 2025-05 | 2.1 | 392,836.1 |
| 2025-06 | 2.8 | 390,028.3 |
| 2025-07 | 2.7 | 331,190.7 |
| 2025-08 | 3.0 | 371,922.5 |
| 2025-09 | 4.1 | 387,491.2 |
| 2025-10 | 3.7 | 410,061.4 |
| 2025-11 | 3.7 | 401,047.9 |
| 2025-12 | 4.5 | 414,926.1 |
| 2026-01 | 6.5 | 423,070.6 |
| 2026-02 | 6.4 | 425,254.2 |
| 2026-03 | 11.8 | 445,986.3 |
| 2026-04 | 17.7 | 508,142.5 |
| 2026-05 | 5.4 | 449,731.6 |
| 2026-06 | 0.8 | 424,815.6 |
| 2026-07 | 3.8 | 364,321.8 |
| 2026-08 | 7.3 | 418,183.8 |
| 2026-09 | 17.1 | 425,150.7 |
| 2026-10 | 21.9 | 374,184.6 |
| 2026-11 | 3.2 | 353,475.6 |
Houston’s exports move with the Brent–WTI spread. With the spread averaging $17 in September and $22 in October, US crude was cheap to buyers in Europe and Asia; at $2.52 the gap barely covers the freight. The 2026 peak, 508k t/day in April, came with the first spread spike ($17.66 that month), and the fall since October came with the collapse. Two panels on one time axis rather than a dual axis.
Houston tanker export volume, yearly mean (thousand t/day); * = 2026 to 13 Nov.
All 28 chokepoints: tanker transits, last 30 days vs calendar-2024 mean (bars; red = down, blue = up; names in red are 20 % or more below 2024). The right-hand columns: change vs the 30 days before (bold where it moved 10 % or more; – where the prior 30 days were zero) and the last-30-day rate.
All twelve curated ports, last 30 days.
| Port | Exports t/day | vs 2024 | vs prior 30 d | Imports t/day | vs 2024 | vs prior 30 d | Tanker calls/day | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rotterdam | 97,831 | -18% | -14% | 393,117 | -7% | -11% | 40.8 | 43.2 |
| Houston | 359,826 | -9% | -10% | 37,934 | -47% | -24% | 14.1 | 14.7 |
| Ningbo | 33,131 | +12% | +9% | 200,767 | -6% | +17% | 10.9 | 14.7 |
| Fujairah | 98,349 | -8% | +14% | 54,039 | -48% | +7% | 5.6 | 9.0 |
| Trieste | 92 | -88% | +448% | 96,028 | -3% | -14% | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Qingdao | 27,360 | +1% | +65% | 66,490 | -23% | +46% | 3.0 | 3.6 |
| Primorsk | 79,561 | -45% | +25% | 0 | – | – | 1.4 | 2.7 |
| Sikka | 66,272 | +79% | -2% | 1,920 | -69% | -46% | 2.1 | 1.1 |
| Ust-Luga | 62,756 | -58% | -22% | 399 | -89% | -1% | 1.4 | 4.1 |
| Novorossiysk | 59,441 | -40% | -46% | 30 | -97% | -20% | 0.8 | 4.1 |
| Jubail | 36,372 | -62% | -21% | 2,273 | -47% | -15% | 1.1 | 3.7 |
| Yeosu | 3,829 | +39% | +108% | 835 | -29% | -16% | 1.3 | 1.7 |
Red/blue = 20 % or more below/above. Primorsk records no imports; Trieste and Yeosu are small in this layer. Sorted by total tonnage.
Monthly tanker transits since Jan-2019, one sparkline per chokepoint, sorted worst-first (last 30 d vs 2024). Red names = 20 % or more below 2024.
| Theme | First (27 Aug) | Second (23 Sep) | Third (2026-11-17) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hormuz | closed since March, 0.9–5.4/day | still closed, 0.9/day; a June window found in the daily data | still closed; October and November the quietest months on record; no reopening attempt since July |
| Price | Brent ~$91, tracks the strait (−0.74) | Brent $131, +45 % with no change at the strait; spread $24 | peak $136 on 2 Oct, back to $92; spread $2.52, near the 2025 norm |
| Red Sea | diversion intact, mirror −0.83 | both routes down; fewest since Jan-2024 | October rebound, November new low (25.0); Suez 10% above 2024 |
| Russia | Baltic halved, Novorossiysk doubled | Kerch at zero; Baltic recovering; Novorossiysk at norm | both outlets down; three ports 137k t/day, lowest since 2019 |
| Gulf ports | — | Fujairah rebuilding (88k), Jubail −71 % | Fujairah 104k, at its 2024 level; Jubail 75% below 2024 |
| Asia | — | China’s two ports −34 %, Sikka +89 % | China’s two ports 321k, 7% above 2024; Sikka steady |
| Houston | 433k, +42 % since 2019 | 432k, unchanged | 353k, lowest since Jul-2025, following the spread down |
hormuz_reopening_attempt (proposed in the Second): no fires since 12 July; over the closed regime it fires only on the June window. Ready to wire into the signals engine.redsea_capacity_shrinking (proposed in the Second): Bab el-Mandeb + Good Hope below its trailing-12-month low. Fired in 2026: Sep, Nov; October was back inside the band.russia_seaborne_low: Novorossiysk + Ust-Luga + Primorsk monthly exports below their 2019-onward minimum. Fires for October and November.us_export_arb_closed: 5-day mean of Brent − WTI below $4. Fires now ($2.21); chart 8 is the back-test.=ES.Get("PORTWATCH.HOUSTON.OIL_EXPORT.D","2024-01-01") beside =ES.Get("PET.RBRTE.D","2024-01-01") and PET.RWTC.D reproduces chart 8.